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Bankhhead v. Bankhead involved an appeal from a decree of
divorce granted the wife on the grounds of physical cruelty.
The appeal centered on the fact that the wife had not met the
burden of establishing physical cruelty by a preponderance of
the evidence. A divorce in South Carolina may be granted
on grounds of physical cruelty,2 which has generally been
defined as actual personal violence or such a course of physical
treatment as endangers life, limb, or health and renders co-
habitation unsafe.
8
There were three separate allegations of physical cruelty.
The first incident resulted in no injury, and the wife subse-
quently resumed cohabitation. The wife alleged that in the
second altercation she received an injury and consulted a
physician, although, as she testified, he found no injury. The
wife alleged that in the third incident her husband struck her
and she received cracked ribs and numerous bruises.
At the trial the wife failed, however, to call the physician
who supposedly treated her, her father who was present immed-
iately following one of the altercations, or anyone who could
verify her disablement following any of the incidents. The
court, in reversing the decree, found that the wife had failed to
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that there was
physical cruelty. The rule is well established and is set forth in
Crowder v. Crowder4 :
The burden is upon the wife, who brings the action for
divorce, to establish by preponderance of evidence
charges of physical cruelty against her husband. This
carries with it the necessity of presenting corroboration
of the material allegations of her complaint or explana-
tion for its absence. 5
In Bankhead the wife, in failing to produce any corroboration
for her allegations, failed to meet the test. The court also
1. 173 S.E.2d 372 (S.C. 1970).
2. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 20-101(3) (1962).
3. Brown v. Brown, 215 S.C. 502, 56 S.E2d 330 (1949).
4. 246 S.C. 299, 143 S.E2d 580 (1965).
5. Id. at 306, 143 S.E2d at 584.
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commented that the first allegation was insufficient as the wife
showed condonation of the act by resuming cohabitation. "Con-
donation may be presumed from cohabitation; and lapse of time,
or continuance of marital cohabitation with knowledge of the
offense raises a presumption of condonation."6
Il. ADopToIO
Bevis v. Bevis7 was a proceeding by a stepmother to adopt
the two minor children of her husband by a former marriage.
The natural mother of the children had refused to consent to
the proceeding and had denied that she had abandoned the
children. She did not contest the right of the stepmother to the
custody of the children, but only asked that her parental rights
not be completely terminated.
The central issue, as set forth by the court, concerned the
necessity of having the consent of the natural mother to the
adoption.
An adoption of a child may be decreed when there
have been filed written consents to adoption executed
by: (a) Both parents . . .; provided, that consent shall
not be required from one whose parental rights have been
judicially terminated .... s
This proceeding was brought under section 31-51.1 et seq. of the
Code of Laws, which provides a statutory remedy, separate from
the adoption statutes,9 for terminating parental rights.'0 If,
upon hearing, a court of competent jurisdiction finds that a
child has been voluntarily abandoned for a period in excess of
twelve months, it may issue an order barring parental rights."I
In Bevis, though the natural mother was voluntarily sep-
arated from the children for a period of nearly five years, she
maintained contact with them through visits, correspondence,
and personal gifts. The court, affirming the lower court in
denying the adoption, held that statutes providing a method by
which one person may be adopted as the child of another are in
6. McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 244 S.C. 265, 136 S.E.2d 537 (1964).
quoting from 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 123(9) (1959).
7. 175 S.E.2d 398 (S.C. 1970).
8. S. C. CODE ANN. § 10-2587.7(a) (Supp. 1969).
9. S. C. CODE ANN. §10-25872 et seq. (Supp. 1969).
10. Richland County Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Mickens, 246 S.C. 113, 142
S.E.2d 737 (1965).
11. S.C. CODE ANN. § 31-51.4 (1962).
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derogation of the common law and, therefore, are to be strictly
construed in favor of the parent and the preservation of the
relationship of the parent and child.12 Abandonment is generally
defined as "conduct on the part of the parent which evinces
a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all
parental claims to the child."' 3 After weighing the evidence
as to the natural mother's continued contacts with the children,
the court concluded that all parental rights should not be termi-
nated, as it was evident that she did not intend to relinquish
all her parental claims to the children.
IT. SUrrOT AND VISITATiOw RiGHTs
In Holtzclaw v. (rawford' 4 the plaintiff-husband filed a pe-
tition seeking a reduction in the support payments for his child
and a liberalization of visitation rights. The husband contended
that the original visitation arrangement was ineffective, because
it was based upon the fact that both parties resided in the same
town, whereas at the time of petition they resided sixty-five
miles apart. He also contended that the original sum of $100.00
per month for support of the child included $40.00 which was to
be used to provide care for the child while the wife worked.
Since the decree, the wife had remarried and was no longer
employed; therefore, the $40.00 for the care of the child was not
necessary.
The issues were referred to a special referee who recommended
a reduction of payments and liberalization of visitation rights.
The circuit court, with slight modification,' 5 affirmed the rec-
ommendation of the referee. The supreme court affirmed the
circuit court's ruling as to visitation rights. The general rule, as
set forth in Porter v. Porter,16 is that "[tihe matter is one ad-
dressed to the trial court's broad discretion and that in the
absence of a clear abuse of such, the order granting, denying, or
limiting visitation rights will not be distarbed."'1 7 The court
found no abuse of discretion by the lower court.
The court reversed the circuit court on the question of reduc-
tion of support payments. Generally, a provision for child sup-
12. Goff v. Benedict, 252 S.C. 83, 165 S.E.d 269 (1969).
13. 2 Am. Jum. 2D Adoption § 32 (1962).
14. 253 S.C. 314, 170 S.E.2d 382 (1969).
15. The circuit court further reduced the $77.00 per month payment set by
the referee to $60.00 per month.
16. 246 S.C. 332, 143 S.E.2d 619 (1965).
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port in a decree of divorce is not final in the sense that it
cannot be changed; and, usually, the court has continuing au-
thority to modify such a provision from time to time.' However,
as the court pointed out, the wife testified that the original stun
of $100.00 was needed to care for the child properly. The hus-
band offered no proof to the contrary. The remarriage of a
divorced wife is not of itself grounds for reducing the amount to
be paid for the support of a minor child.19 As the record failed
to show any justification for the reduction of payments, the
$100.00 sum was reinstated by the court.
IV. LEIA SEPARAiON
Smith V. Smith20 involved an action for divorce brought by
the wife on the ground of physical cruelty. The wife, in the
alternative, moved that, in the event an absolute divorce was not
granted, she be granted a legal separation. The trial court denied
and dismissed the divorce proceeding; in a brief order the court
declared that one act of physical abuse does not constitute
grounds for divorce. The court failed to pass on the alternative
relief sought by the wife. The supreme court reversed and re-
manded the entire cause because of a "very brief and incom-
prehensible order" which made it impossible for the court to
determine if the trial court had been influenced or controlled by
error of law in denying the divorce.
As to the question of the trial court's failure to consider the
alternative relief sought by the wife, the supreme court held
that the trial court was in error. The causes for which separate
maintenance may be granted are not confined to those which
constitute grounds for divorce. Accordingly, a court may decree
such maintenance, although the divorce is denied.21 The court
pointed out that, even though the wife might not have been
entitled to a divorce, it was evident that she was in potential
danger of physical abuse. As a result she was entitled to an
order allowing her to live free and separate from her husband.
V. ALImomY
In Graham v. Graham,22 an action for divorce, the plaintiff-
wife asked for alimony, support, and separate maintenance. An
18. 27B C.J.S. Divorce § 322(1) (1959).
19. Sanders v. Sanders, 230 S.C. 263, 95 S.E.2d 440 (1965).
20. 253 S.C. 350, 170 S.E.2d 650 (1969).
21. Todd v. Todd, 242 S.C. 263, 130 S.E2d 552 (1963). See also Piana v.
Piana, 239 S.C. 367, 123 S.E2d 297 (1961); Machado v. Machado, 220 S.C.
90, 66 S.E.2d 629 (1951).
22. 253 S.C. 486, 171 S.E.2d 704 (1970).
[Vol. 22
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order was filed requiring the husband-defendant to pay alimony
pendente lite and support money at a rate of $350.00 monthly.
Six months later a hearing was held to determine why the de-
fendant had failed to comply with the order. The defendant
answered that his new business venture had not proven successful
and, as a result, he could not make the payments. The judge
reduced the payments for a period of three months at the end of
which time they would revert to the original sum.
The wife then filed an amended complaint seeking a divorce
a vin lo matrimonii upon grounds of adultery, physical cruelty,
and desertion.28 The divorce was granted on the ground of
desertion, and alimony and support payments were ordered at
$350.00 per month. In view of the fact that the husband's busi-
ness was still lagging, the payments were, however, reduced to
$250.00 per month for a period of six months at the end of which
time they would revert to the original amount of $350.00 per
month. The husband contended that the award was excessive and
that the trial judge had abused his discretion in decreeing such
an award. This contention was based on his former wife's
earning capacity and needs.
In Porter v. Porter24 it was held that an award of alimony in
a divorce suit rests within the sound discretion of the trial
judge and will not be disturbed on appeal unless abuse is shown.
However, as stated in Murdoce v. Murdole , 25
[a] wife is never entitled to alimony as a matter of
course; it is entirely discretionary with the court to
allow her such alimony as ... is reasonable . . . tak-
ing into consideration ... the ability of each to earn
money in the future, and their conduct in the past. 26
And further, the amount of the award should not be excessive
but should be fair and just to all parties concerned. 27
It was undisputed in the Graham record that the defendant's
net income for 1968, prior to payment of taxes, was $370.65
monthly, and the wife's net monthly income was $316.83 for the
same year. The supreme court, in reversing, held that the award
was excessive, since it would require sixty-seven percent of the
defendant's income for the six-months reduced period and ninety-
23. S.C. CODE, AiN. § 20-101 (1962).
24. 246 S.C. 332, 143 S.E.2d 619 (1965).
25. 243 S.C. 218, 133 S.E2d 323 (1963).
26. Id. at 224, 133 S.E.2d at 326, quwting from 17 Am. Jur. Divorce and
Separation § 672 (1957).
27. Porter v. Porter, 246 S.C. 332, 143 S.E2d 619 (1965); Murdock v.
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four percent of his income at the monthly rate originally set.
Considering the earnings of the parties and their respective
needs, it was concluded that the trial judge had abused the
discretion vested in him.
VI. CUSTODY
In PuZZen 'v. PUllen,28 an action to determine custody of chil-
dren, the parties, while still married, entered into a support
agreement under which the mother was to have custody of the
children and the father was to have visitation privileges. Ap-
proximately six months later the mother instituted an action
for divorce on the grounds of desertion; the divorce was granted,
and the decree incorporated the existing support and custody
agreement. Subsequently, the father, who had remarried, entered
a petition for permanent custody which was denied. The follow-
ing summer the father again brought a petition for permanent
custody, wherein he alleged that the mother was working, that
she was unable to care for the children properly, and that she
was not a fit and proper person. The action was referred to
a master who recommended that the mother should retain custody
of the children and that the father's visitation rights should be
liberalized. The trial judge rejected the master's report and
awarded custody to the father.
The dominant consideration in a custody dispute is the welfare
of the children.20 The general rule for determining custody in
post-divorce proceedings is, however, as follows:
[A] final divorce awarding the custody of a child in a
divorce case, based on an agreement of the parties, is
conclusive as between them if no change of circum-
stances affecting the welfare of the child is shown 30
On appeal the mother contended there had been no such change
of circumstances since the first order of the court denying the
change of custody. Though it is the rule in South Carolina that
a change of circumstances may warrant a change of custody,3'
there must be a showing of new facts and circumstances.82 The
28. 253 S.C. 123, 169 S.E2d 376 (1969).
29. Ford v. Ford, 242 S.C. 344, 130 S.E2d 916 (1963) ; Noon v. Koon, 203
S.C. 556, 28 S.E.2d 89 (1943); S.C. CODE AxN. § 20-115 (1962).
30. 24 Amr. Jurt. 2D Divorce and Separation § 825 (1966).
31. Porter v. Porter, 246 S.C. 332, 143 S.E.2d 619 (1965) ; Moore v. Moore,
235 S.C. 386, 111 S.E.2d 695 (1959).
32. Ex parte Atkinson, 238 S.C. 521, 121 S.E.2d 4 (1961); Williams v.
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court noted that the father's allegations that the mother was
unfit were rejected by the master and stated that the master's
recommendation should have been given greater weight because
of his opportunity to observe the witnesses.33 Because the record
indicated no change of circumstances, the supreme court reversed
and reinstated the custody of the children to the mother.
VII. CH AGE OF VENUM
In Brockmanv. B'ook= s04 the defendant-husband moved for
a change of venue in a divorce proceeding. He alleged in his
complaint that he lived in Spartanburg County and supplied
an affidavit which stated that he had been a resident of Spar-
tanburg County for six years prior to the date of the affidavit.
The plaintiff-wife did not dispute the contents of the affidavit.
The motion for a change of venue was denied, and the defendant-
husband appealed.
The court, in reversing and remanding the case, cited section
20-106 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina pertaining to
venue in a divorce action. The statute provides that actions for
divorce shall be tried in the county in which the defendant re-
sides at the commencement of the action. The defendant's affi-
davit stated that he was a resident of Spartanburg County at the
commencement of the action and that he had been for six years
prior. The court also held that, where there was a motion for
change of venue based on the fact that the county named in the
affidavit was the residence of the defendant and this fact was
not disputed, such motion must be decided as a question of law
by the trial judge.3 5
VII. JURSDICTIOx
In McGlohan v. Haran86 the- sole issue was whether or not
the Family Court Act of 196837 provided jurisdiction for the
Laurens County Civil and Family Court38 to determine, without
a jury, paternity of an illegitimate child, and upon determination
33. See also Ex parte Atkinson, 238 S.C. 521, 121 S.E.2d 4 (1961); Powell
v. Powell, 231 S.C. 283, 98 S.E2d 764 (1957).
34. 253 S.C. 528, 171 S.E.2d 862 (1970).
35. See also Sanders v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 235 S.C. 259, 111 SE.2d
201 (1959).
36. 174 S.FE2d 753 (S.C. 1970).
37. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1095 et seq. (Supp. 1969).
38. The Civil and Family Court of Laurens was established by an Act of
the General Assembly on June 19, 1969, and is now embodied in the Code.
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to order the father to support the child. 9 The supreme court
affirmed the decision of the lower court holding that the lower
court had jurisdiction to determine, without a jury, the paternity
of an illegitimate child and to order support for the child under
the authority of the Family Court Act of 1968.40 The appellant's
contention was that a jury trial in the Court of General Sessions,
under section 20-303, of the South Carolina Code of Laws, was
the exclusive remedy for the determination of paternity.
41 Con-
ceding that, if the defendant had been charged with an offense
under that section, he would have been entitled to a trial by
jury, the court noted that this was not an offense against which
any criminal sanctions could be enforced. Thus, the court con-
cluded that a jury trial was not the exclusive remedy for
determining paternity and that the family court had jurisdic-
tion to make such a determination.
IX. Um .ORx LGwosLTioN
Gardner v. Gardner4 2 involved the application and operation
of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.4 3 The
action, based on a foreign divorce decree granted by the State of
Nevada, was brought to enforce the decree and to recover ac-
crued and unpaid alimony as well as future alimony, main-
tenance, and support payments. The husband alleged that,
subsequent to the Nevada decree, the wife had brought an action
in the Spartanburg County Court for support based on an order
obtained in California requiring the defendant to pay $60.00
per month for the support of two children. The husband con-
tended, therefore, that the Nevada decree had already been
modified by the order of the Spartanburg County Court.
The supreme court held that the defendant's theory was in
error in that the Spartanburg order was based on the California
order and, therefore, did not modify the Nevada decree. The
defendant's theory would, furthermore, have been contradictory
39. The plaintiff in this action alleged that the defendant was the father of
her illegitimate child and asked the court for an order requiring him to
contribute to the support of the child.
40. Four sections of the Family Court Act were cited by the court: § 15-
1095.24, § 15-1095.24(b) (2), § 15-109524 (17), and § 15-1095.24(37) (3).
41. Prior to 1962, §§ 20-305 through 309 of the Code provided the
procedure for determination of paternity of illegitimate children, but in 1962,
§ 20-303 was amended to include legitimate and illegitimate children, there-
fore repealing § 20-305 through § 20-309.
42. 253 S.C. 296, 170 S.E.2d 372 (1969).
43. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-311 et seq. (1962).
(Vol. 22
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to section 20-329 of the South Carolina Code of Laws which
provides:
Any order of support issued by a court of this state
when acting as a responding state shall not supersede
any previous order of support issued in a divorce or
separate maintenance action, but the amounts for a
particular period paid pursuant to either order shall be
credited against amounts accruing or accrued for the
same period.4
The original decree of Nevada provided for payments of $250.00
monthly for support and maintenance of the wife and two
children. The court noted that the Spartanburg County Court,
in accordance with section 20-329 of the Code, did grant credit
to the defendant for his payments under the California order;
but that, pursuant to the statute, the Spartanburg County Court
could not issue an order which would have the effect of super-
seding the Nevada divorce decree.
HUBERT E. YARBoROUGH, III
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